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INTRODUCTION
Time-sharing computer systems permit large numbers
of users to operate on common sets of data and programs.
Since certain parts of these computer resources may be
sensitive or proprietory, there exists the risks that
information belonging to one user, may, contrary to his
intent, become available to other users, and there is the
additional risk that outside agencies may infiltrate the
system and obtain information.
The question naturally arises of protecting one
user's stored program and data against unauthorized
access by others. Considerable work has already been
done in providing protection against accidental access
due to hardware malfunctions, but only recently the atten-
tion has been given to the protection of computations and
information against those who attempt to gain access to
private information without having proper authority. A
central concern in protection is the authorization problem
(Friedman, 1970) which involves determining whether a user
who is recognized by the system should be allowed access
to information he desires. The true authorization problem
arises when several users are provided access to a common
1
2data file; given the restriction that users are not per-
mitted access to all data. Such a requirement may arise
in police networks, government data centers, banking data
centers, management information systems, or credit
bureaus.
In this report, a solution to some of the problems
concerned with the access control in a computer is defined
and discussed. Special attention is concentrated on the
problems of protecting both user and system information
when shared procedure and data are permitted.
A set of processor access control mechanisms which
were devised for the MULTICS system are described here.
(A processor is a hardware device that is capable of
executing a sequence of instructions.) MULTICS is a gen-
eral purpose, multiple user, interactive computer system
developed at project MAC of MIT (Corbato and Vyssootsky,
1965). In the course of MULTICS development, MAC research-
ers discovered that the processor provided only a limited
set of access control mechanisms. The MULTICS system uses
the concept of concentric protection rings to provide a
variety of access rights (or level of authorization). The
technique relies on the use of hardware and software facil-
ities. In the MULTICS system for example, if a user has
a file which in part contains sensitive data, he cannot
merge all his data with that of his colleagues. He often
must separate the sensitive data and save that in a
3separate file; the common pool of data does not contain
this sensitive and highly valuable data.
Although a great deal of effort has already been
expended to protect computer resources from their environ-
ment, it is still true that no computer system has with-
stood determined efforts to bypass its internal protection
controls by someone who has been given user programming
access to the system. Such penetration efforts have been
successful against virtually all available systems. Be-
cause of diversity and complexity of the problem, an
adequate and comprehensive protection mechanism is not
easy to design. This report does not intend to describe
specific solutions to various protection problems; rather,
it describes some mechanisms that support adequate solu-
tions to protection problems and access control.
At the beginning, the general needs to control access
to stored information in a computer utility are discussed
here, and several criteria for comparing different sets
of access control mechanisms are presented. (The computer
utility is a generalization of the time-sharing concept
which enables a central facility to dispense computer re-
sources to users in an effective and efficient manner.)
Considerable attention is given to the concept of protec-
tion mechanisms and the way these mechanisms are implemented
to control access in a computer utility. Particular atten-
tion is focused on the concept of protection rings (Graham,
4.
1968) as implemented in MULTICS, and the concepts of
protection domains and capabilities relevant to access
control.
A variety of other protection features such as pass-
words and cryptography have been included in most computer
systems; however these other protection features have
shown some obvious disadvantages and can be bypassed if
the basic protection mechanisms are bypassed or broken.
A variety of ideas and protection mechanisms are defined
and discussed in this report. According to these discus-
sions. the concepts of limited protection domains and
capabilities are shown to be very effective and fundamental
for enforcing protection of information and controlling
access rights in a computer utility. Passwords and crypto-
graphic techniques appear to exhibit some limitations and
certain inefficiencies.
I. ACCESS MANAGEMENT IN A COMPUTER UTILITY
Protection of computations and information is an
important aspect of a computer utility. The community of
users of a computer utility certainly have diverse inter-
ests. It probably includes users who are competitive
commercially. The system is used for many applications
where sensitive data, such as company payroll records,
need to be stored in the system. On the other hand, there
are users in the community who wish to share with each
5other; data and procedures. There are even groups of
users working cooperatively on the same project. Service
bureaus, software producing companies, and other service
organizations have procedures which they wish to rent. A
great potential benefit of a computer utility is its abil-
ity to allow users to easily communicate and cooperate.
The role of protection in a computer utility is to control
user interaction; guaranteeing total user separation when
desired, allowing unrestricted user cooperation when neces-
sary, and providing different users with flexible, but con-
trolled, access to shared data and procedures. A good pro-
tection mechanism should not permit a user to interfere
with other users. Without adequate protection, a dishonest
user may alter the accounting procedure or data, thereby
causing inequitable charges.
While there are many different modes of protection in
a computer utility, most may be related to controlling
access to stored information. Since stored information
represents both data and procedures, control of access to
stored information serves to regulate information proces-
sing as well.
General Properties of a Protection Mechanism
According to Graham (May, 1968), a satisfactory
protection mechanism should have the following properties:
1. The capability to isolate one program from
another, that is, a user should be able to
6deny any access by other users to all of his
segments. (A segment is a contiguous block
of words containing a program, data, or both.)
2. The capability for a user to allow controlled
access to his segments.
3. The capability to recognize different layers
of protection in the same process. (A process
is basically a program in execution.)
4. The capability for allowing procedures to be
called across layers of protection without any
special programming on the part of the calling
procedure.
According to Schroeder and Saltzer (March, 1972) four
criteria can be applied to a set of access control mechan-
isms to judge its usefulness in a computer utility: func-
tional capability, economy, simplicity, and programming
generality. The first criterion means that a set of access
control mechanisms should be able to satisfy user protection
needs in a natural manner (a quality which allows user in-
terface. An obvious goal is to maximize this capability).
The second criterion, economy, refers to the fact that the
cost of specifying and utilizing a particular protection
mechanism should be low enough that it is not an important
consideration in determining the required level of access
control. In addition, cost should be proportional to the
functional capability used. The third criterion, simplicity,
refers to the practice of designing the protection mechan-
ism so simple that they may be completely understood. The
fourth criterion, programming generality, means that the
protection mechanisms should not control the way in which
programs are organized and developed. It permits sharing
7in such a way that encourages users to build upon one another's
work. Obviously, it is not easy to design access control mech-
anisms which satisfy all of the above four criteria at the same
time. Improvements in functional capability come at the ex-
pense of economy, simplicity, and programming generality. An
important aspect in designing a set of access control mech-
anisms should be to maximize functional capability within the
frame of the other three criteria. Protection mechanisms vary
from system to system. In fact, they are sometimes different
for different parts of the same system. For example, there
are systems which have one protection mechanism for the file
system, another for main memory, etc.
In computer systems, all information resides on some
storage device. Hence, the information can be protected
by dividing the address space (the collection of programs
and data that are accessed in a process) of these storage
devices into regions and allowing information to flow be-
tween regions in a controlled way. Each region of address-
able space must be protected from unauthorized attempts by
those who wish to obtain or alter information.
As an example, we consider protection in a file system.
Each file should be protected from users who want to read
the file or write into the file without presenting adequate
authorization. Passing from one region of addressable space
to another is similar to crossing a wall or a fence separ-
ating the regions. The walls are not penetrable, so, the
8only way to cross a region is through the entries called
"gates." Communication between the regions must be pro-
tected. That is, there must be a control mechanism at the
gate to allow only authorized users to access the region.
The walls which separate the regions of addressable space
must be related to the addressing mechanism used in that
particular system.
Passwords
In most existing file systems which are concerned with
protection of information, passwords are used to enforce
access control and to provide software protection for
sensitive data (Madnick/Donovan, 1974). Associated with
each file in the file directory is a password. Password
schemes generally permit specific types of access to files.
The user requesting access to a file must provide the cor-
rect password. If a user wishes to allow another user to
access one of his files, he simply tells him the password
for that file. In this environment, when a program attempts
to open the file for input or output, a request is made to
the operator to enter the correct password. If the opera-
tor cannot enter the correct password, then access to that
file is denied. Therefore, the sensitive file can be pro-
tected. The use of passwords or prearranged set of ques-
tions requires no special hardware and is the least expen-
sive means of user identification. This method has another
9advantage in that only a small, fixed amount of space is
needed for protection of information for each file. Its
disadvantage is that passwords could be obtained by wire-
tapping the communication links and other means. A dis-
honest systems programmer may be able to get all the pass-
words, since the protection information is stored in the
system. Another disadvantage of passwords is that access
control cannot easily be changed. Ifa user wishes to deny
access of a file to a user who has the password, how does
he do it? He can change the password, but now he has to
inform all other users who are to be allowed access. Even
if this were not the case, there are other reasons why
password schemes as implemented to date do not properly
solve the problem of access control in a large computer
data base shared by many users.
One of these reasons is that passwords have been
associated with files. In most current systems, information
is protected at the file level only. Normally it is assumed
that all data within a file have the same level of sensi-
tivity. In real world situations this assumption is not
necessarily true. Information from various sources is con-
stantly coming into common data pools, where it can be used
by all persons with access to that pool. Problems arise
when certain information in a file should be available to
some but not all authorized users of the file.
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Cryptography
An alternative method for enforcing access control is
the use of cryptographic techniques to provide protection
for data transmission and to protect sensitive data files
(Katzan, Computer Data Security, 1973). A common threat
involved in tranmission of data is wiretapping. An effec-
tive method to prevent this is to encipher messages before
transmission and decipher them after transmission. This
technique prevents the disclosure of sensitive information.
Sensitive files can be stored in an enciphered form to pro-
vide maximum protection against both accidental and mali-
cious infiltration. All users may access the enciphered
files but only authorized users know the way to deciper
the contents. It should be noted that even the simplest
method of encipherment can prevent accidental disclosure;
at the same time, however, a more sophisticated crypto-
graphic technique may be beaten by a professional intruder.
There are many different approaches for enciphering/de-
ciphering of messages. It can be performed by computer
programs or by hardware devices depending upon the needs
of particular computer installation and its users.
A cipher system consists of the following:
1. A set of rules that comprise the basic crypto-
graphic process. This is called the general
system.
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2. A key (encoding sequences of characters), which
may be variable and is chosen by the user for
encoding the message.
The general system may be broken down into two
classes:
1. Transposition methods; and
2. Substitution methods.
A transposition cipher involves a rearrangement of the
characters of the original message in a prearranged manner.
There are several transposition cipher methods. A simple
and an elementary transposition cipher is one in which the
characters of the original message are written in reverse
order and then transmitted in groups of five characters.
The characters lose their position but retain their iden-
tity.
Substitution cipher involves replacement of the
characters of the original message by other characters.
The characters retain their position but lose their iden-
tity. One of the advantages of using a computer program
as an enciphering/deciphering mechanism is that the same
program can be used to transform data files prior to being
written on a storage medium, and for reversing the process
when they are subsequently read.
It is not intended to discuss various ciphering tech-
niques here, rather, the intention is to investigate the
12
effectiveness of cryptographic techniques for enforcing
access control.
Cryptographic techniques have the advantage over the
passwords method in that the code key does not have to be
stored in the system, but the technique does impose the
cost of encoding the files. The user needs to enter the
code key only while he is enciphering or deciphering the
file. Thus, there is no table that a dishonest system pro-
grammer can read to find all code keys or allow himself
access. To discourage trial-and-error code breakers, the
cryptographer should change keys at frequent intervals.
It should be noted that present-day communication
cryptographic equipment is very expensive, and as a result
it is not economically feasible to provide all the crypto-
graphically-secure channels which are considered necessary.
For example, it has been said that the cost of providing
cryptographic security on every communication link carry-
ing sensitive military traffic could exceed the total expen-
diture for the entire remainder of the system.
In the following sections, a set of hardware access
control mechanisms that was devised in the course of
MULTICS development is described. These mechanisms appear
to provide a significant improvement in the simultaneous
satisfaction of the four criteria mentioned earlier.
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II. SEGMENTED VIRTUAL MEMORY ENVIRONMENT
In a virtual memory environment a job's address space
no longer constrained by the size of physical memory, be-
cause the operating system produces the illusion of an ex-
tremely large memory by allowing information to reside on
auxiliary storage devices, such as discs, tapes, drums, etc.
Since this large memory is merely an illusion, it is called
virtual memory (Donovan and Madnick, 1974).
In a system where users may share data in memory, it is
essential to have control over access. There is a need to
have a variety of access rights for each separate block of
information. Current mechanisms allow memory to be subdi-
vided into a large number of separate blocks of information
called segments (Graham, May 1968). Each segment is a con-
tiguous block of words containing a program, data, or both.
It has a number of access control switches which specify
various access privileges such as write/no-write, execute/
no-execute, slave/master, etc. (Computers designed for mul-
tiprogramming usually have two modes of operations called
master/slave or privileged/non-privileged.) This hardware
features allows varying degrees of access to each segment.
An executing program in a segmented environment does
not reference memory by abaolute address. Rather, the mem-
ory is composed of independent segments identified by num-
bers. All address space references require two components:
(1) a segment specifier and (2) the location within the
14
segment. In a segmented environment, each job's address
space actually consists of a collection of segments. The
access rights are controlled through segment descriptors
as shown in the following section.
A Protection Model
In this section; a model of hardware features which
permits a satisfactory solution to the protection problems
is described. A major component of this model is a segment
(Katzan. 1973). In a computer with segment-addressing each
word is addressed by an ordered pair of integers (S,W). S
is the segment number and W is the word within the segment.
Segment numbers range from 0 to a maximum allowable number
of segments in a process; and the word number ranges from 0
to the current length of the segment to which it refers.
Associated with each segment is a segment descriptor which
contains location of the beginning of the segment, the cur-
rent size of the segment, and the access control indicator
(see figure 1).
beginning access
of segment-indicator
Fig. 1--Descriptor
The access indicator specifies whether the segment can
be processed in slave mode, may be written, or may be exe-
cuted. The access indicator alsc includes a fault bit"
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(Katzan, 1973) that causes an interrupt, whenever an un-
authorized attempt is made to reference the segment. An
interrupt is a hardware facility that causes the cpu to sus-
pend execution, save its status, and transfers to a specific
location which specifies the address of a program that is
intended to take action in response to the interrupt (Mudnick,
1974). The following cases demonstrate the options that are
permitted in processing a segment:
1. The segment is privileged procedure (when
slave indicator is off and execute indicator
is on).
2. The segment is writable data (when write in-
dicator is on and execute indicator is off).
3. The segment is pure procedure (when write
indicator is off and execute indicator is on).
A pure or reenterant procedure is one that
does not alter itself or contain data or any
locations that are altered.
If the slave indicator is on, any procedure may
access the segment, otherwise, only a master made segment
(one with the master indicator on in its descriptor) may
access it. If a fault bit is not zero, no access at all
is permitted (interruption).
For every segment which a process may access, the cor-
responding descriptor resides in a description segment which
is composed of segment descriptor words (SDWs). Each SDW
is used to describe a single segment of the virtual memory,
and the segment number of a segment used in an address is
actually the index of its SDW in the descriptor segment.
Thus, each user is assigned a collection of segments,
called its virtual memory, and a special segment which
16
describes the segments that comprise the virtual memory.
Among other things, a SDW contains the absolute address of
the beginning of the corresponding segment in memory.
In any system there is a large number of descriptor
segments. One descriptor segment exists for each active
process (i.e., user or job), and whenever that process is
executing, a hardware register reffered to as the "descrip-
tor base register" contains the absolute address of the be-
ginning of the corresponding descriptor segment in memory.
The contents of dsecriptor base register indirectly defines
that set of segments to which an executing process has
access. Each processor contains logic for automatically
translating two-part addresses into the corresponding abso-
lute addresses. Changing the absolute address in the de-
scriptor base register of a processor will cause the ad-
dress translation logic to interpret two-part addresses rela-
tive to a different descriptor segment. This facility can
be used to provide each user of the system with separate
virtual memory. A single segment may be part of several
virtual memories at the same time, allowing straightfor-
ward sharing of segments among users. In order to imple-
ment layered protection, the location counter and each
descriptor is augmented with a field which contains a ring
number as shown in figure 2.
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beginning access
of segment length .d. o ring number
segment descriptor word
in a segmented virtual memory
RING SEGMENT NUMBER OF CURRENT
NUMBER EXECUTING PROCEDURE WORD NUMBER
Fig. 2--Location counter in a computer system using
a segmented virtual memory and protection rings.
III. PROTECTION RINGS
Associated with each process are a limited number of
domains called protection rings (a domain is a set of
access rights which provides the means to protect procedure
and data segments from other procedures that are part of the
same computation). A ring (or more precisely, a protection
ring) is a set of segments. The ring structure can be illus-
trated as concentric circles. In this way, segments of the
memory containing sensitive information can be placed in a
privileged ring together with programs that process, update,
and extract this information. A subscriber enters a ring
only at a carefully defined point, and once he enters the
ring his activity is completely controlled. Various parts
of the file have different conditions of access and differ-
ent levels of privilege. The user must specify all of these,
in addition to his name, problem number, account number, etc.
The MULTICS system, on which this ring concept has been
implemented, is a general-purpose, multiple-user interactive
I
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computer system developed at ..I.T. 's project MAC. These
rings are numbered from 0 to a maximum allowable number in
that particular system. The sets of access rights repre-
sented by the various rings of a process form, a collection
of nested subsets, with ring 0 the largest set and the maxi-
mum numbered ring the smallest set in the collection. Thus,
a process has the greatest access privilege when executing
in ring 0, and it has the least access privilege when execu-
ting in the maximum numbered ring (Sultzer and Schroeder,
March 1972).
Assigning a number to each ring is the mechanism by
which access is controlled. Each segment is assigned to one
and only one ring, when a procedure is executing in a seg-
ment, it assumes the ring number of that segment. The ring
number determines its access level. The lower the ring num-
ber a procedure is executing in, the greater its access
privileges. Rings numbered zero have the greatest privilege
and are usually assigned to the supervisor. The ring struc-
ture is shown in figure 3 (page 19).
A procedure may access a segment with a segment number
greater than its own ring number. Thus, if a procedure
executes in ring m, then it has access to any segment n,
where m<n, but it has no access to any segment K, where
K<m, except with support of the supervisor program that exe-
cutes in ring 0. In addition to the ring numbers, access con-
trol is managed through the access indicators mentioned above.
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Ring n
Ri n 2.
S Ring 
. 0
Fig. 3--Protection Ring Structure
Practical Considerations
Several Dractical considerations arise. The system
should be aware of the passage of control from one ring
to another. For example, when a procedure executing in
ring m desires to tra:nsfer Cpu control to another segment
with ring n, where Men, then the system should be aware of
this change in control. When this happens, an interruption
or a fault occurs. This fault is directed to the supervisor
so that it may carry out appropriate housekeeping. This
raises another consideration. When shared subroutines are
used, all "calls" would have to pass through the super-
visor or a copy of each routine would have to exist for
each ring in its domain, Both of the above methods are
inefficient. In order to solve this problem, these types
of procedures are assigned to a consecutive set of rings,
called the access bracket of the procedure. The access
bracket is stored in the r;ing field of the segrment descrip-
tor word. The ring field of the descriotor will then
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contain two integers specifying the lowest ring and the
highest ring in the access bracket.
Now a transfer by a procedure in ring i to another
procedure with access bracket (Nl, N2) where nl<i<n2
does not cause a fault and does not cause control to
change rings, i.e., control remains in ring i. This means
the value of the ring field of the location counter does
not change. A reasonable and useful interpretation of the
access bracket can be made for data segments. The follow-
ing example clarifies the role of access bracket. Consider
the segment D with access bracket (Nl, N2). A procedure
in ring i may:
1. Write into D if i<nl (provided the write indica-
tor is on).
2. Only read D if nl<i<n2 (even if the write indica-
tor is on).
3. Not access D at all if i>n2.
Supporting Software
In this section, a software necessary to support the
satisfactory implementation of the protection mechanisms
described before is briefly explained (Graham, 1968). We
first consider the problem of allowing passage of control
into an inner ring from an outer (higher numbered) ring.
As it was mentioned earlier when a procedure executing in
ring i attempts to transfer to another procedure with
access bracket (Nl, N2) and i>n2 a fault occurs. Since it
is not usually desirable to allow transfer of control to a
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procedure from an outer ring to an inner ring, the concept
of access bracket is extended to include a third integer,
n3, which defines the call bracket. The three integers are
referred to as the ring bracket. When a procedure executing
in ring i attempts to call a procedure, p with ring bracket
(Nl, N2, N3), the following cases are identified:
1. If n2<i<n3 the call is permitted only to
specific entry points in p. (The call
bracket is implemented by software.)
2. If i>n3 the call is not permitted at all.
3. If i>n2 a fault occurs. The fault handler
sorts out this case for n2<i<n3.
A key component in the implementation of protection
using ring structures is ring 0 routine called the gate-
keeper that is used by the system to manage interring
crossings and returns. It checks to see whether access
should be allowed or denied.
The use of protection rings is a technique for achiev-
ing access control and protection in a multiple user
environment. Protection rings offer the potential for in--
creased versatility so that protection can be more closely
matched to the needs of the users of the system.
Additional Considr'ations of Protection Rings
The association of _ultiole domains of protection
with a process (a process may be executing in several pro-
tection rings) generates tie need for a new kind of access
capability; the capability to change the domain of execu-
tion of a process. This changing of domain provides
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additional access capabilities available to a process and
must be carefully controlled. In other words, switching
the ring of execution to lower numbered ring makes addition-
al access capabilities, while switching the ring of execu-
tion to a higher numbered ring reduces the available access
capabilities. A domain provides the means to protect pro-
cedure and data segments from other procedures that are part
of the same computation. By using domains, it should be
possible to make certain access capabilities available to
a process only when particular programs are being executed.
Restricting the start of execution in a particular domain
to certain program locations, called gates, provides this
ability, because it gives the program sections that begin
at those locations complete control over the use made of
the access capabilities included in the domain. Thus,
changing the domain of execution must be restricted to occur
only as the result of a transfer of control to one of these
gate locations of another domain. A process changes its
protection status by changing the domain out of which it
operates.
With a completely general implementation of domains,
each domain could provide protection against the procedures
executing in all other domains of a process. The correspond-
ing property of rings is that the protection provided by
a given ring of a process is effective against procedures
executing in higher numbered rings. Switching the ring of
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execution to a lower numbered ring makes additional access
capabilities available to a process, while switching to a
higher number reduces the available access capabilities.
Thus, the downward ring switching capability must be coupled
to a transfer of control to a gate into the lower numbered
ring.
In MULTICS, there is a hierarchy of files and programs.
Each segment (program or file) has clearance level. This
level is placed in a hardware register when the program is
in control. If the program calls another program (or accesses
a file) which is not at the same security level or a lower
level, a hardware interrupt is taken. The interrupt rou-
tine must then examine a gate list which contains the list
of acceptable users who may access this segment. Thus,
when an access request is made to a segment, the gatekeeper
program checks to see that the requestor is on the segment's
gate list. If not the security levels of the two segments
are compared, and the requestor is permitted access only if
his programs have a sufficient level of clearance. The
gatekeeper distinguishes types of access as read, write, and
execute. In this sytem, there is a security matrix which
is stored in the form of gate lists, which indicate whether
user i can access datum j for read/write/execute purposes.
The following section gives an extensive discussion of
protection domains which provide a better understanding of
the kinds of control required.
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IV. PROTECTION MODELS AND PROTECTION DOMAINS
A protection model views the computer as a set of
active elements called Subjects and a set of passive
elements called Objects (Graham and Denning, 1972). The
protection model defines the access rights of each subject
to each object. This protection model can be represented
in the form of a protection matrix as shown in figure 4.
OBJECTS
U
.______File x
user A execute
read
Fig. 4--A Protection Matrix
The rows of this matrix correspond to the users of the
system (subjects). The columns of the matrix correspond to
the objects. For each subject/object pair, the correspond-
ing entry in the matrix defines the set of access rights
that the subject has to object. Figure 4 shows that user A
(Subject), may read or execute file x (Object). Access
rights in this protection matrix also control changes to the
protection matrix itself; for example, a user with "Delete
access to a file is able to eliminate the particular file
from the protection matrix. A protection domain defines
the set of access rights that one subject has to the objects
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of the system. Protection domains are represented as rows
of the protection matrix. The following PL/l data struc-
ture represents an example of a typical data file and its
corresponding security matrix which grant access right
selectively to different users within the system (Conway
and Maxwell, April 1972) .
DECLARE 1 EMPLOYEE (1000)
2 SOCSEC NO
2 NAME
2 ADDR
3 STREET
3 CITY
3 STATEZIP
2 SALARY
3 PREV
3 CURRENT
2 PERFORMANCE
3 CLASS
3 INDEX
2 MEDICAL
3 PHYSICAL
3 DOCTOR
Fig. 5--A typical file represented as a PL/l
array of structures.
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SALARY PERFORMANCE
USERS SOCSECNO NAME ADDR CURRENT CLASS INDEX MEDICAL
A R R R R,W R,W R,W R
B R R R R.W N N N
C R R R R,W RW R,W R
D R R R N N N R,W
E R N N N N N N
F N N N N N N N
Key: R--Read access
W--Write access
N--No access
Fig. 6--Security matrix for the file represented in Figure 5.
In most recent computer systems subjects represent
basically the authorized users of the system. In these
systems, the supervisor or operating system is another sub-
ject which has total access to all objects in the system.
In these systems, every subunit of a user's program executes
in the same protection domain, and that protection domain
has access rights to all objects that a user ever needs.
With this model of protection, it is not easy to limit the
access rights of specific subprograms executed on behalf of
a user. A small subunit of a program typically only needs
access to a small number of objects. If small subunits of
a program execute in their own protection domains, then
the protection domain can be kept limited and relatively
small. A large program usually needs access to many objects.
Thus, protection domains can be kept small and limited only
if a large program executes in many different protection
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domains and constantly switches between these protection
domains during its execution.
Protection Domain Switching
A change in the domain of execution of a process can
occur only when the executing procedure transfers control
to a gate of another domain (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1972).
In the context of most programming languages, whenever a
transfer occurs within the procedure, this represents a
subroutine call, a return following a call, or a non-local
goto. All of these three operations produce a change in
the environment of the execution point. Each procedure
could have its own protection domain, although every pro-
cedure call does not necessarily involve a domain switch.
The phrase, "protected procedure;" is used when it is
necessary to emphasize that the procedure call does involve
a domain switch. A protected procedure appears as both a
subject and an object in a protection matrix. It is an
object because other subjects may have the right to call it.
The right to call a procedure requires a special access
right such as an "enter" right to the procedure. The pro-
tected procedure is also a subject in the protection matrix
because it executes in its own protection domain. The
call operation has the additional function of transmitting
arguments and recording a return point. Whenever a call
takes place, the execution begins in the protection domain
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of the called procedure. A return instruction triggers a
return to the previous protection domain. Performing these
functions generally requires the cooperation of both the
procedure initiating the operation and the procedure re-
ceiving control. The domain switch is simplified if there
are no access rights passed as parameters in the call.
Figure 7 illustrates a simple domain switch. In this sit-
uation, user A, executing in his basic domain, can call
Editor. A dictionary (the dictionary may contain descrip-
tions of the files, report, and other entities known to the
system, as well as the security information) can only be
read while executing in the editors domain. (The security
matrix is contained in a special dictionary, which is
created by the user.) The user can read or write files
x and y either from his basic domain or after calling the
editor. however, he can use the dictionary to check the
files for spelling mistakes only when he has transferred
control to editor.
OBJECTS
Editor File x File y Dictionary
co
V
P4
Fig. 7--Simple Domain Switch
Read Read
User A Enter Write Write
Read Read Read
Editor Write Write
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The situation becomes more complex if access rights
to objects are to be passed as parameters and if the pro-
tected procedure is to be reenterant. (A procedure is
reenterant if it has completely separate data and procedure
sections. Reenterant code can be stored among several
users by giving each user a private copy of the data sec-
tion and allowing all users to share a single copy of the
procedure section.) In this case, the call of the pro-
tected procedure results in the creation of a new protection
domain; conceptually meaning that a new row is created in
the protection matrix. This new protection domain contains
both the permanent access rights of the protected procedure
(these are defined by a template domain associated with the
procedure) and the access rights that are passed as param-
eters in the call. The new protection domain is destroyed
by the return from the protected procedure. Figures 8 and
9 illustrate this situation.
OBJECTS
Editor File x File y Dictionary
U
C)
Cl)
Fig. 8--Protection matrix before call to editor.
User A Enter Read Read
Write Write
Editor Read
Template_
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OBJECTS
Editor File x File y Dictionary
U User A Enter Read Read
Write Write
Editor Read
Template
U) Instance Read Read
of Editor Write
Fig. 9--Protection matrix during call to editor.
In figure 8, the user is executing in his basic domain,
and the editor's template domain only has the right to read
the dictionary. If the user then calls the editor in order
to edit file, x, he passess access rights for file x to the
editor. This creates a new domain labeled instance of
editor," in figure 9. If file y is sensitive, the user
does not have to allow the editor access to it, and the
editor can protect the dictionary from direct access by the
user. The domain change for a reenterant protected proce-
dure seems to be cumbersome when it is explained in terms
of an abstract protection model. Later on, an implemen-
tation is suggested that allows protection domain to be
created and destroyed easily and efficiently. The following
sections discuss and illustrate the concept of capabilities
and their significance in the design of protection mechan-
isms relevant to access control.
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V. CAPABILITY-BASED ADDRESSING
Capability may be thought of as a uniform method of
addressing and protecting access to shared segments and
procedures. A capability may also be considered as a ticket
whose possession confers access privileges for the stored
object (segment). Capability-based addressing (Fabray, 1974)
is a way to address and control access to objects even when
the objects are stored in the primary memory of a computer
system. Different systems use capabilities in quite differ-
ent ways. Capabilities generally have the following proper-
ties:
1. Capabilities are system-protected names for
objects (segments). A subject has access to
an object only if it possesses a capability
for that object. Capabilities are permanent
and can be stored in programs or in the auxi-
liary memory for an indefinite period.
2. A part of the capability determines the access
rights that the capability allows to the object
that it names.
3. When an object is created, a capability for
that object is created. Any subject in posses-
stion of a capability has some freedom to move
it, to copy it, or to pass it as a parameter
to procedures in different domains, but it is
not allowed to modify it.
The creator of the object may give a copy of the capa-
bility to other subjects. Recipients of a copy of a capa-
bility may use it to access the object, or they may make
other copies of it to give to other subjects. When a capa-
bility is given to another subject, the access rights of
the capability may be restricted. Therefore, each copy of
a capability may allow varying access rights to the object.
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Capabilities are similar to descriptors as implemented
in MULTICS. Several systems have used capabilities to facil-
itate sharing and protection of objects that are not loaded
in primary memory. In these systems, interpretation of
capabilities is done by software, and the primary memory is
addressed and controlled by whatever means is available.
Calls to the system software are needed in order to use a
capability or switch to a different protection domain.
The following explanation of capability--based address-
ing assumes that memory is organized into segments, where a
segment is a variable length sequence of memory words. A
word in a segment is addressed by supplying an identifier
(a number) for the segment and an offset that specifies the
particular word of the segment. A descriptor as implemented
in MULTICS and the Burroughs Systems, is a protected iden-
tifier that points to a segment. The descriptor also speci-
fies the access rights that are allowed to the segment. An
instruction references a memory word by pointing to a de-
scriptor for the segment and by providing an offset to speci-
fy the desired words of the segment. Access rights of the
segment descriptor are used to deny undesired access to
segment. Capabilities are almost identical to descriptors.
They perform the same function of identifying the segment
and specifying the access rights to the segment. The pri-
mary difference between capabilities and descriptors arises
because descriptor-based systems usually provide little
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freedom to manipulate the descriptors (only hardware and
low level of system software control all movements of the
descriptors), while capability-based systems allow the
capabilities to be moved and copied and passed as param-
eters. This freedom to manipulate capabilities greatly
simplifies the implementation of parameter passing during
a domain switch.
Implementations for Capability-Based Addressing
A capability usually consists of an identifier that
can be used to find the object, a field which defines the
type of the object, and a field defining the access rights.
Figure 10 illustrates a capability that allows only read
access to a segment. The access rights field is probably
a set of bits--one bit for each mode of access. The in-
terpretation of these bits depends on the types of the
object.
Type of the Access
IDENTIFIER Object Rights*
Pointer to the Segment Segment Read
*A set of bits--one bit for each mode
of access.
Fig. 10--Internal Structure of a Capability
Control over capabilities is necessary to prevent a
user from creating a capability which can be used later on
to give unauthorized access to an object. In order to
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achieve this type of control, two approaches exist:
1. Capabilities should be stored always in
special locations such as capability seg-
ments and capability registers.
2. An extra tag bit should be included with
each memory word. The tag bit must be
inaccessible to the user. It identifies
whether the word contains a capability, and
the hardware then controls the modification
of the words that are identified as capa-
bilities.
The identifier in a capability can be implemented in
two different ways:
1. The identifier may be a pointer to the ob-
ject--it may contain the address for the
object.
2. The identifer may be a unique code that is
permanently associated with the object. This
is called a unique identifer.
The pointer approach makes it simpler to use the
capability to reach the object. Each time the identifier
points directly to the object, then it must be updated
whenever the object is moved. If the capabilities are
not updated properly, then a capability for one object
may end up pointing to a different object.
The second approach, based on unique identifier, makes
it unnecessary to keep track of capabilities and to update
them. A unique identifier cannot be reused unless all
capabilities for the previous object have been destroyed.
The unique identifier approach requires that the current
address of the object must be determined from the unique
identifier; each time the capability is used to address
the object. This would be implemented by maintaining a
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large hash table to associate the current address of objects
with the unique identifier of the capabilities.
Implementing Limited Protection Domains
A capability corresponds to a set of access rights for
a single object in the protection model. A protection do-
main, which is a row of the protection matrix, is realized
as the set of capabilities that are accessible to the sub-
ject.
There are two most frequently used types of capabil-
ities which are often given special treatment. A storage
capability grants access to a segment in the virtual memory
of a process. Its access code may specify read, write, or
execute permissions. An enter capability grants permission
to invoke a procedure in a domain differing from that of
its caller.
Figure 11 illustrates a part of a protection matrix
and the corresponding capabilities. In this figure; user
A can call the editor and pass access rights for file x by
passing a copy of the capability for file x. The next
section describes the implementation of efficient switching
between protection domains.
36
OBJECTS
Subjects/Objects Editor File x File y Dictionary
Capabilities of User A
ID for Editor PROC Enter
ID for File x File Read/Write
ID for File y File Read/Write
Capabilities of Editor Template
ID for File Read
Dictionary
Fig. 11--Protection matrix stored as capability.
VI. CAPABILITY-BASED IMPLEMENTATION OF EFFICIENT
DOMAIN SWITCHING
With capability-based addressing, it is reasonably
straightforward to implement domain switching as part of
the hardware implementation of the call and return opera-
tions. With appropriate hardware support, the overhead to
switch projection domains could be comparable to that of a
simple procedure call in existing computer systems. The
capability automatically provides access authorization to
User A Enter Read Read
Write Write
Editor
Template Read
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the object and enforces limitations on the authorized
access.
The most efficient implementation for domain switching
is probably achieved by using stacks (Neuman, 1975). The
process stack is divided into frames. At any time in its
execution, the process has access only to the stack frame
associated with the most recent protected procedure activa-
tion. In calling another protected procedure, parameters
for the call are pushed into the stack, and the call instruc-
tion delimits the new stack frame to be used by the calling
procedure. This situation is illustrated in figure 12. In
this figure, a call occurs to an editor, and the frame
markers are used to delimit the stack frames. After the
call to the editor, only that part of the stack above the
highest stack frame marker is accessible. Parameters may
be data or capability.
When the editor issues a return instruction, the
editor's stack frame is deleted--except for any return data
or capabilities. The return data is left on the top of the
stack. Figure 13 shows the state of the stack after return
from the editor. If the editor has copied a capability for
the dictionary into the stack, then this copy of that
capability is automatically deleted by the return instruc-
tion.
Before Call
Capability to enter
the editor
Capability for
file x
Other capabilities
and temporary data
Fig. 12--State of the stack
to the editor.
After Call
Capability for
file x
Frame Marker
Capability to enter
the editor
Capability for
file x
Other capabilities
and temporary data
Frame Marker
before and after a call
Fig. 13--State of the stack after return from
the editor.
VII. DIRECTORIES FOR THE STORAGE AND SHARING OF
CAPABILITIES
In a protection system which allows a large number
of independent protection domains, the protection domain
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Frame Marker
Return data and
capabilities
Capability to enter
the editor
Capability for
file x
Other caDabilities
and temporary data
Frame Marker
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must be stored and maintained efficiently. If each protec-
tion subject had to store large lists of capabilities, one
for each object, it is allowed to access, then the mainte-
nance of all this information could be a serious problem.
There must be provisions for controlled sharing of
capabilities between users of the system. If capabilities
are stored in data segments, then any segment can be used
to store and share capabilities. To maintain control over
capabilities, most long term storage and sharing should be
handled by a system of directories that are designed for
these purposes.
A directory is basically a table of enteries that
associate user chosen names with capabilities. Directories
can have three distinct roles in a capability-based system:
1. They allow objects to be addressed by user-
chosen names rather than by the system-gener-
ated capabilities.
2. They guarantee the existence of at least one
capability for every existing object.
3. They simplify the storage and maintenance of
the information required to implement a pro-
tection matrix and preserve the capability of
inactive users.
A subject with access to a given directory is allowed
to request the capability associated with a given name.
To facilitate controlled sharing, it is desirable to have
a means of allowing subjects access to some of the capa-
bilities stored in a directory without necessarily allowing
them access to all the capabilities in the directory.
MULTICS accomplished this task by using access control
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lists (Saltzer, July 1974) which provide a list of all users
who may access the segment. Tne enteries in the list give
the access attributes for every domain which has access
privileges to the particular object. For each object, the
subject which created that object provides a procedure and
an access control list. A generalization of this approach
has been suggested based on the idea of locks and keys. In
every domain, there is a list of objects together with a
bit pattern for each object; the bit pattern (the key) serves
as an identification for the access privileges to the object.
Associated with the object there is a list of unique bit
patterns (locks) together with associated access privileges
for each bit pattern. A request to the directory system
requires both a capability for that directory and a key.
The request is fulfilled only if the key matches a lock that
has been associated with the named entry in the directory.
The key can be implemented as a capability. In this case,
the capability is simply an identifier and its modification
is not allowed except to limit its access rights. Direc-
tories, themselves, are protected objects of the system, and
a specific directory can be accessed only by a subject pos-
sessing a capability for that directory. For security it
would be useful if the system could guarantee that the direc-
tory system is the only means to share. capabilities between
distinct users or to store them for relatively long periods
of time. This makes it much easier to control and to
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monitor the security status of the system. Directories are
also useful as a way of modifying protection domains when
users share access to objects. Thus, directories play a
key role in storing and maintaining protection domains.
(Each subject's protection domain includes all the capabil-
ities that the subject can retrieve from the directory sys-
tem).
Correct Implementation of Protection
Correct implementation of the basic protection mech-
anism is critical to all security. If the basic protection
and addressing mechanisms are broken or bypassed, other
elements in the system will be in danger. Thus, the correct-
ness of the protection mechanisms must be guaranteed with
a very high degree of confidence. The implementation of a
very flexible protection system is more complex and more
difficult than the implementation of a more rigid and
limited protection system. The concept of limited protec-
tion domains as implemented in MULTICS which was mentioned
earlier, makes it easier to control the interactions between
different system modules. Furthermore, capability-based
addressing simplifies some of the system software. In
order to encourage good programming practices and to sup-
port the concept of limited protection domains, protection
mechanisms should not prevent a program from referring sub-
tasks to other protected procedures. Thus, a program should
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be able to pass any of its own access rights to another
protected procedure. On the other hand, there are situa-
tions where one user of the system must be prevented from
making access rights available to another user.
Suggestions
During the process of devising an access control method,
the following principles are suggested to be kept in mind:
1. The method should allow efficient control of
individual data elements (rather than of files
or records only).
2. The method should not extract unwarranted cost
in storage or elsewhere from the user who wants
only a small portion of his data protected.
3. The method should be independent of both machine
and file structure.
4. Finally, it should be sufficiently modular to
permit cost-effectiveness experiments to be under-
taken.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This report focuses on ideas and concepts that support
protection of information in a computer utility. Several
mechanisms and techniques which control access to stored
information are discussed and illustrated. The idea of
using password schemes and cryptographic techniques as
methods of enforcing access control and providing software
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protection for sensitive data, is not a new one. However,
these methods although useful and economically feasible for
certain applications, do not satisfy the needs and require-
ments of today's time-sharing concept, where large numbers
of users operate on common sets of data and programs.
There are several reasons why present password schemes
do not properly solve the problem of access control in a
time-sharing environment. One of these reasons is that pass-
words usually have been associated with files. In most cur-
rent systems, information is protected at the file level only.
It is normally assumed that all data within a file are
at the same level of sensitivity. In real world situations,
this assumption is not necessarily true. Information from
various sources which comes into common data pools, can be
used by all of the users who have access to that pool. Prob-
lems arise when certain information in a file should be
only available to some but not all authorized users of the
file. Another disadvantage ofthe password methodis that a
dishonest systems programmer may be able to get all the pass-
words, since the protection information is stored in the
system. There are still other problems with password
methods which make them inefficient and disadvantageous.
The use of protection rings is another technique for
achieving access control and protection in a multiple user
environment. The protection provided by a given ring of
a process is effective against procedures executing in
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higher numbered rings. Switching the ring of execution
to a lower number ring makes additional access capabilities
available to a process, while switching to a higher number
reduces the available access capabilities. Thus, the down-
ward ring switching of capability must be coupled to a
transfer of control to a gate into a lower numbered ring.
The concept of call bracket as implemented in MULTICS,
efficiently manages the transfer of control between pro-
tection rings and checks to see whether access should be
allowed or denied.
The concept of limited protection domains as explained
before, is another effective technique for enforcing access
control. This technique limits and restricts the access
rights of specific subprograms executed on behalf of a
user. This restriction is necessary, otherwise every sub-
unit of a user's program may execute in the same protection
domain, and that protection domain has access rights to all
subjects that a user ever needs. Furthermore, a small sub-
unit of a program typically only needs access to a small
number of objects. If small subunits of a program execute
in their own protection domains, then the protection domain
can be kept limited and relatively small. Limited protec-
tion domains allow each subunit or module of a program to
be executed in a restricted environment that can prevent
unanticipated or undesirable actions by that module.
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A large program usually needs access to many objects.
Thus, protection domains can be kept small and limited
only if a large program executes in many different protec-
tion domains and constantly switches between these protec-
tion domains during its execution. With a completely general
implementation of domains, each domain could provide pro-
tection against the procedures executing in all other
domains of a process.
Another approach to enforce access control and to pro-
vide software protection, is based on the concept of capa-
bilities incorporated into the addressing structure of
the computer. Capability-based addressing is a way to
address and control access to segments even when the seg-
ments are stored in the primary memory of a computer system.
This technique is seen as a particular way to support future
requirements for protection without sacrificing for flexi-
bility and sharing.
A comparison of internal structure of capabilities and
descriptors (figures 1 and 10), shows that the two tech-
niques are basically similar. They both perform the same
function of identifying the segment and specifying the
access rights to that segment. Descriptor-based systems,
as implemented in MULTICS, make use of access control lists
to associate permissions with objects and to check authori-
zation on each access, while a capability-based system,
makes use of capability lists to associate permissions with
46
domains and checks authorization only once, whenever capa-
bilities are granted. the reduced need for checking con--
tributes to run time efficiency in the capability-based
method. To facilitate controlled sharing; it is desirable
to allow subjects access to some but not all of the capa-
bilities which are stored in the directory.
The primary difference between capabilities and de-
scriptors arises because descriptor-based systems usually
provide little freedom to manipulate the descriptors (only
hardware and a low level of system software control all
movements of descriptors), while capability-based systems
allow the capabilities to be moved and copied and passed
as parameters. This freedom to manipulate capabilities
greatly simplifies the implementation of parameter passing
during a domain switch, and furthermore it simplifies some
of the system software.
In short, the capability-based addressing technique
appears to be the simplest and the most thorough approach
to enforce limited protection domain and to control access
rights in a computer utility. Many ideas concerning pro-
tection in computer systems are still the subjects of
basic research, and before they are put into practice,
they need to be examined more. A breakthrough in protection
will not be easy to achieve. Any single idea may not suc-
ceed if it is not properly supported by other equally new
ideas. It is a major undertaking to achieve an effective
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combination of those ideas. Although improved security
and protection usually involves higher costs, the new ideas
promise to promote security and lead to the development of
a better software and reduce the costs at the same time.
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